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Book Review  
In Search of a Materialist Ethics 
Review of Adrian Johnson, Prolegomena to Any Future 
Materialism Volume 2: A Weak Nature Alone  
(Northwestern UP, 2019)  
Review by Cat Moir  
A Weak Nature Alone is the (sub-)title of the second instalment of Adrian 
Johnston’s tripartite series Prolegomena to Any Future Materialism. The aim of the 
Prolegomena project is to ‘establish the foundations for a new materialist theoretical 
apparatus’ (2013 xi)  – which Johnson dubs ‘transcendental materialism’ – drawing on 
Hegel, Marx, Lacan, and contemporary analytic philosophy (particularly Anglo-American 
neo-Hegelianism) in order to provide an ontology (volume 2) and theory of the subject 
(the yet-to-appear volume 3) that is atheist and science-oriented. 
At the end of Volume 1, The Outcome of Contemporary French Philosophy (2013), 
Johnston left us with a statement of what his transcendent(al) materialism consists in. 
The somewhat (deliberately) unconventional transcendentalism of his materialism rests 
on the idea of ‘the subject as transcendent-while-immanent vis-à-vis the sole, Otherless 
plane of lone physical being’ (2013: 178). In other words, subjectivity is of matter, and 
cannot (or at least, does not) exist without it, is not something separate from it (in other 
words matter is a condition of possibility for the existence of subjectivity). Johnston’s 
transcendental materialism is materialist, therefore, in the specific sense that it requires 
subjects to think the real conditions of possibility of the emergence of subjectivity in non-
conscious matter (2013: 179). It is transcendental in that it ‘affirms the immanence to 
material nature of subjects nonetheless irreducible to such natural materialities’ (2013: 
178).  
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 Having cleared the ground with his articulation of transcendental materialism in 
the Outcome, the Prolegomena’s second volume, A Weak Nature Alone, sets out to 
develop the materialist ontology in which his theory of subjectivity is embedded. The 
ontology of nature Johnston aims to develop here is one in which ‘human subjects can be 
seen to arise in immanent, bottom-up fashions from nature itself’ (2019: xi). In other 
words, Johnston’s project here follows in the footsteps of the work of Engels, Lenin and 
others to ‘rethink the concept of matter’ in such a way as to make room for 
consciousness, to quote Ernst Bloch (1972: 17) on the subject, or, in Isabelle Stengers’s 
words, to explain nature ‘in such a way that there would be no absurdity in affirming that 
it produced us’ (Stengers in Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, re.press: Melbourne, 2011: 368). 
 The axiomatic statement of Johnston’s position is offered already in volume 1: 
‘There is just a weak nature (as conflict-ridden matrices of under-determination), and 
nothing more’ (2013: 5). Johnston argues that the Sellarsian scientific image of reality 
with which we contend today is one in which discontinuous and contingent events 
combine to produce dynamics that appear (and to some degree indeed are) lawful and 
stable, but are (also) inherently conflictual, dynamic, and highly complex. It is this 
inherent instability of the material real – which Johnston terms ‘nature’ – that allows 
what he calls ‘non-natural’ (subjective, psychological, social, cultural etc.) phenomena to 
arise. The thesis of ontological incompleteness underpinning Johnston’s conception of 
nature thus brings him into close proximity to not only Žižek, one of his explicit key 
influences, but also some new materialist thinkers, particularly Karen Barad (2007). 
Unlike Barad and other new materialists such as Jane Bennett (2010), however, Johnston 
does not ascribe agency or inherent vitality to matter. Rather, drawing on Hegel, he 
describes nature as self-denaturalizing in the progression from substance to subject. 
Johnston builds his ontology on the basis of in-depth reconstructive 
interpretations of a range of figures, most notably Hegel (in part 1 of the book), Marx, 
Engels, Soviet and western Marxist thinkers including Lukàcs, Lenin, and Althusser (part 
2), Lacan (part 3), and American analytic philosophers, above all McDowell, Pippin and 
Cartwright (part 4).   
Hegel, the subject of part 1 of the book, is central to Johnston’s ontology of nature. 
Not only the concept of nature as progressively self-denaturalizing, but also the titular 
concept of weak nature is of Hegelian origin. Weak nature is Johnston’s term for the 
natural world of which modern science presents us with an image: far from the strong 
Nature with a capital N of many materialisms and naturalisms, among which Johnston 
counts the Spinozist and Darwinian varieties, Hegelian weak nature is fragmented, 
transitory, and – at least until we reach the level of organic life and especially the animal 
organism – remains largely unreflexive. Admittedly, these claims could also be made of, 
if not Spinozism, then certainly Darwinism if one does not take the latter z- as Johnson, a 
self-confessed post-Darwinian materialist, seems to – as a fully-fledged ontological 
monism, but rather as a more regional theory or set of theories concerning the adaptive 
evolution of life.  
Such quibbles concerning the genealogical coordinates Johnson plots here are 
arguably the result of an underdeveloped analytic distinction between the foundational 
concepts of ‘materialism’, ‘naturalism’, and ‘realism’ in the book, whose frequent 
concatenation in formulations such as ‘a subjectivist thinker opposed to materialisms, 
naturalisms, and realisms’ (2019: 19) obscures what might be considered to be important 
and useful distinctions between these terms. ‘Materialism’, for instance, very often 
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involves, as it does in Johnston’s case, an ontological statement about the constitution of 
the real, namely that it is in some sense ‘made of’ matter, whether ‘matter’ is considered 
in the nineteenth-century atomistic sense or in the more dematerialized, post-quantum 
sense of the word. It also often involves a statement about the mind/brain-body relation, 
though materialism qua metaphysical and/or cosmological theory need not always 
overlap with or imply materialism in this latter sense (cf. Wolfe, 2020). Meanwhile, though 
‘naturalism’ and ‘materialism’ typically share the conviction that the phenomena we 
encounter in the world are amenable to scientific investigation, naturalism need not imply 
materialism in the strong ontological sense of a theory concerning the fundamental 
materiality of the whole natural order. 
These considerations are significant for Johnston’s account of Hegel, whose 
distinction between the natural and non-natural Johnston takes over, albeit in an 
emergentist rather than dualist form (2019: 133). Thus, although Johnston’s ontology 
locates subjectivity immanently within the contingent structures of material nature, in its 
emergence from the latter it is the result of nature’s self-denaturalization and is thus not 
strictu sensu natural. The implication that post-natural subjectivity and its products are 
still material phenomena implies significant overlap between materialism and naturalism 
here, and positions Johnston’s Hegel as essentially a materialist thinker. This might be 
provocative for some, not only because matter clearly does not occupy a foundational 
position in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature (as the subject of ‘inorganic physics’ in §§ 203-
257, matter is treated much more in the manner of a regional res extensa within nature), 
but also because it renders the distinctions between Hegelian absolute idealism and 
Marxian historical materialism – vigorously disputed not only by Marxists – much less 
pronounced than they have often historically been. 
 In many respects, the discussion of Hegel covers ground that those acquainted 
with contemporary work on Hegel’s critical naturalism (Deranty, 2012; Gambarotto and 
Illetterati, 2020; Ikaheimo, 2012; Giladi, 2014; Laitinen and Särkelä, 2019; Lumsden, 2016; 
Ng, 2020; Renault, 2012; Testa, 2012; not to mention Malabou (2005) with whom Johnston 
is in extensive dialogue) will recognise. Much of this scholarship is concerned precisely 
with tracing the emergence of structures of subjectivity out of pre- or proto-subjective 
organic life along the lines Johnston draws here. Thus, although Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Nature certainly was largely neglected until recently (2019: xvii), Johnston’s work 
participates in a broad effort to reinterpret it.  
Something similar can be said for the treatment of Marx, Engels, and Marxisms in 
Johnston’s book. In recent years, Marxist authors (inter alia Foster, 2020; Leslie, 2016; 
Malm, 2016; Moir, 2020a; Moore, 2015; Saito, 2017) have reappraised Marxist treatments of 
nature and the natural sciences such that the hostility to the concept of a dialectics of 
nature is arguably no longer so pointed as Johnston proposes (2019: xviii). Johnston’s 
treatments of Althusser and Lukács also find worthy interlocutors in the form of, for 
instance, Marc Berdet (2013) and Michael J. Thompson (2019).  
Johnston’s rehabilitation of a dialectics of nature – consistent with the ongoing 
revival of Engels that positions him as an ecological thinker of the first order – is 
balanced by a truly important insight in the book’s second part on Marx and Marxisms: 
that the ideas put forward in Engels’ dialectics of nature fundamentally unite Marx and 
Engels against the caricature – at least as old as Lukács’ History and Class 
Consciousness (1923), though only, as Johnston elucidates, partly originating with it – of 
the ‘good’ sober-critique-of-capital Marx and the ‘bad’ metaphysics-of-nature Engels. In 
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contemporary Marxist scholarship on ecology, one still finds versions of this, for instance 
in the debate between Moore and Foster on the question of extractivist capitalism’s 
alleged role in producing what Marx called a ‘metabolic rift’ (over-exploitation of 
resources that brings the temporal scale of human (re-)production into conflict with that 
of carbon, water, and other natural cycles). The problem of seeing Marxian and Engelsian 
materialism as fundamentally opposed on this issue is that it becomes challenging to 
connect the ecological and social critiques. Johnston’s reappraisal of the Dialectics of 
Nature thus arguably does more to rescue Marx from the consequences of that book’s 
fate than it does Engels – all the better for an environmentally grounded critique of 
capital. 
 Parts 3 and 4 of the book are where Johnston’s vision really takes flight. While his 
critique of strongly anti-naturalist interpretations of Lacan will surely be hotly debated by 
Lacanians more and less sympathetic to these arguments, readers with less visceral 
investments in those disputes will also find much to contemplate. Lacan’s ‘qualified 
naturalism’ (2019: 207) is based for Johnston on his (Lacan’s) insistence on the neediness 
of embodied human existence as demonstrated by the helplessness of the new-born 
infant. Even if, as Johnston argues, for Lacan processes of ‘Imaginary-Symbolic 
imprinting and overwriting partially denaturalize need’, the resulting never fully 
denaturalized subjectivity ‘remains […] “not without” (pas sans) a rapport with nature in 
the guise of its bio-material body’ and is thus stuck ‘perpetually struggling with 
stubbornly indigestible bits and fragments of an incompletely and unevenly domesticated 
corpo-Real’ (ibid.). Johnston coins the term ‘anorganicity’ to describe the state between 
being the not-yet-fully-subjective organism and the self-conscious (linguistic) subject, 
and while it is not clear in concrete terms whether only human subjects, prior to our 
entry into language, or also (some) animal organisms inhabit a state of anorganicity for 
Johnston, his positioning of the concept as a missing link in the transition from nature to 
subjective spirit in Hegel’s system has much productive potential. 
 Part 4 of the book returns to Hegel via contemporary Anglo-American neo-
Hegelianism. Johnston sees McDowell’s ‘naturalism of second nature’ intersecting with 
Lacan’s not-quite-anti-naturalism (not to mention Lukács’ concept of second nature, 
though that connection is not explored in detail at this point) in that the free, 
denaturalized subject never fully escapes the determinism of so-called first nature, such 
that the first is always-already permeated with the second (an idea, as I have argued 
elsewhere (Moir, 2020b), that we find present already in Hegel and which Johnston (2019: 
269) helpfully points out that Marx foreshadows in Capital). However, the critique of 
science as practiced by McDowell and Pippin comes under scrutiny here, with Johnston 
convincingly arguing that the ‘science’ with which the aforementioned take issue is 
something of a straw man: contemporary natural science, particular the ‘new science’ of 
complexity, emergence, and contingency that interests Johnston here, does not 
correspond, he argues, to the reductive and eliminativist vision with which McDowell and 
Pippin are said to contend.  
The account of the relevant debates on offer here is impressive, though it does 
raise a question: given Johnston’s claim that contemporary materialists are and/or ought 
to be concerned and aligned with natural science, one wonders how Johnston conceives 
of the specific relation between transcendental materialism and the sciences that he 
claims must engage in self-critique rather than (only?) being subject to the – to use 
Johnston’s phrase, extra-scientific – criticism of philosophy (2019: 279). To borrow terms 
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from Adrian Mackenzie and Andrew Murphie (2008), is transcendental materialism 
intended to take a critical, extractionist, or engaging approach to the sciences? In other 
words, does it seek to criticise the premises of scientific rationality and practice in the 
manner of an ideology critique, to use natural scientific concepts heuristically in order to 
shed new light on aspects of social/cultural/environmental relations, to seek dialogue 
and collaboration with science, or some combination of these? For the most part, 
Johnston’s – compelling, rigorous – encounter with natural scientific concepts and 
theories seems to take the latter at their word, which would be consistent with his claim 
that the residual scientism within the natural sciences should be ‘intra-
scientifically…undone’ (2019: 11). Yet if part of the point of transcendental materialism is 
not to play a part in this process from without, as it were, then the question of why we 
need it comes into view. 
In the first volume of the Prolegomena, Johnston argues that one of the motivating 
reasons for elaborating his transcendental materialism is a certain kind of scientism that 
he claims persists because science has been insufficiently de-theologised. He concurs 
here with Lacan’s insight that even an ostensibly atheistic natural science carries within 
it the traces of theological reasoning, imagery, and sensibility, a fact that gives rise to the 
idea of ‘Nature’ as a Big Other – an attractive, if misleading, over-simplification in an age 
of accumulation-driven climate change. In a claim reminiscent of the one made by 
Meillassoux in After Finitude (2006), Johnston sees our current global conjecture proving 
the Lacanian thesis that the more science reveals the meaninglessness of the Real, the 
more fervently people will turn to forms of (religious, political, scientistic) authority 
claiming to guarantee the stability of meaning. Although the precise problem with this is 
not spelled out explicitly by Johnston, one can conclude that it is this: clinging to the idea 
of a higher agency outside ourselves, whether a vengeful or benevolent god, a ‘Nature’ 
capable of restoring itself to some putatively lost state of equilibrium, an omnipotent 
‘time’ in a Meillassouxian mould, or even a Lacanian ‘word’ still full of Christian 
overtones, exonerates us from the need to act, or even deprives us of the idea that action 
is possible. The aim of transcendental materialism, then, is to purge contemporary 
thought of every ontotheological ersatz for the dead God that Johnston insists in Freudo-
Nietzschean fashion that we must kill again, or perhaps for the first time, in order to be 
truly free. 
The underlying emphasis on freedom in the Prolegomena is consistent with its 
ultimate aim to develop a transcendental materialist theory of the subject, a contribution 
for which we must await the publication of the third and final volume, even if by the end 
of A Weak Nature Alone its contours are coming into focus. But it also indicates the 
political stakes of Johnston’s project, a theory of the subject being arguably an 
unavoidable starting point asking not only what it means to know, but how it is possible 
to act. Thus far such questions, let alone the move from is to ought, are in suspense. If 
Johnston’s trilogy is, as its title suggests, a prolegomena to any future materialism, then 
it may be that we have to wait beyond the trilogy to see what a politics of said future 
materialism might look like. 
References 
 
Barad, Karen (2007), Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Duke UP) 
Bennett, Jane (2010), Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Duke UP) 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






Berdet, Marc (2013), “In the Magnetic Fields of Materialism and 
Anthropology”, Anthropology & Materialism [Online], 1, 2013, Online since 15 
October 2013, connection on 25 January 2021. URL: 
http://journals.openedition.org/am/431; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/am.431 
Bloch, Ernst (1972), Das Materialismusproblem, seine Geschichte und Substanz (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp) 
Deranty, Jean-Philippe (2012), “Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature and the Final Ends of 
Life”, Critical Horizons, 13:2, 275-287 
Foster, John Bellamy (2020), The Return of Nature: Socialism and Ecology (New York: 
Monthly Review Press) 
Gambarotto, A., & Illetterati (2020), L. “Hegel's Philosophy of Biology? A Programmatic 
Overview”, Hegel Bulletin, 41(3), 349-370. 
Giladi, Paul (2014), “Liberal Naturalism: The Curious Case of Hegel”, International Journal 
of Philosophical Studies, 22:2, 248-270 
Ikäheimo, Heikki (2012), “Nature in Spirit”, Critical Horizons, 13:2, 149-153 
Johnston, Adrian, Prolegomena to Any Future Materialism, Volume One: The Outcome of 
Contemporary French Philosophy (Northwestern University Press, 2013) 
Laitinen A, Särkelä A. (2019), “Four conceptions of social pathology”, European Journal of 
Social Theory. 22:1, 80-102. 
Leslie, Esther (2016), Liquid Crystal: The Art and Science of a Fluid Form (London: 
Reaktion Books) 
Lumsden, Simon (2016), “Second Nature and Historical Change in Hegel’s Philosophy of 
History”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 24:1, 74-94 
Malabou, Catherine (2005), The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic. 
Translated by Lisabeth During (New York: Routledge) 
Malm, Andreas (2016), Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam-Power and the Roots of Global 
Warming (London: Verso) 
Mackenzie, Adrian & Andrew Murphie (2008), ‘The Two Cultures become 
Multiple?”, Australian Feminist Studies, 23:55, 87-100 
Meillassoux, Quentin (2006), After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency 
(London/New York: Continuum) 
Moir, Cat (2020a), Ernst Bloch’s Speculative Materialism: Ontology, Epistemology, Politics 
(Leiden: Brill) 
— (2020b) “Second Nature and the Critique of Ideology in Hegel and the Frankfurt 
School’”in Paul Giladi (ed.), Hegel and the Frankfurt School: Traditions in Dialogue 
(London: Routledge) 
Moore, Jason W. (2015), Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of 
Capital (London: Verso) 
Ng, Karen (2020), Hegel’s Concept of Life (Oxford University Press) 
Renault, Emmanuel (2012), “The Naturalistic Side of Hegel’s Pragmatism”, Critical 
Horizons, 13:2, 244-274 
Saito, Kohei (2017), Karl Marx’s Ecosocialism: Capital, Nature, and the Critique of Political 
Economy (New York: Monthly Review Press) 
Stengers, Isabelle (2011), “Wondering About Materialism” in Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and 
Graham Harman (eds.), The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism 
(re.press: Melbourne), 368-380. 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






Testa, Italo (2012), “How does Recognition Emerge from Nature? The Genesis of 
Consciousness in Hegel’s Jena Writings”, Critical Horizons, 13:2, 176-196 
Thompson, Michael J. (ed.) (2019), Georg Lukács and the Possibility of Critical Social 
Ontology (Leiden: Brill)  
Wolfe, Charles T. (2020), Lire le matérialisme (Lyon: ENS Éditions) 
 
 
